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Introduction 
 
Wind power generation has a key role in Spanish electricity system since it is a native 
source of energy that could help Spain to reduce its dependency on the exterior for 
the production of electricity.  
Apart from the great environmental benefits produced, wind energy reduce 
considerably spot energy price, reaching to cover 16,6 % of peninsular demand. 
Although, wind farms show high investment costs and need an efficient incentive 
scheme to be financed. If on one hand, Spain has been a leading country in Europe in 
developing a successful incentive scheme, nowadays tariff deficit and negative 
economic conjunctures asks for consistent reductions in the support mechanism and 
demand wind producers to be able to compete into the market with more mature 
technologies. 
The objective of this work is to find an optimal commercial strategy in the production 
market that would allow wind producer to maximize their daily profit. That can be 
achieved on one hand, increasing incomes in day-ahead and intraday markets, on the 
other hand, reducing deviation costs due to error in generation predictions.  
We will previously analyze market features and common practices in use and then 
develop our own sale strategy solving a two-stage linear stochastic optimization 
problem.  
The first stage variable will be the sale bid in the day–ahead market while second 
stage variables will be the offers to the six sessions of intraday market.  
We will implement two models, one incorporating randomness due to errors in 
generation predictions, the other including also uncertainty in intraday market prices.  
The model is implemented using real data from Fersa Renewable Energies, a wind 
producer leader in Spain.  
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1. Spanish Electricity Market. 
 
Spanish electricity market is a spot (or pool) market, based on merit order dispatch. It 
is organized as a sequence of markets:  
• The day-ahead market; 
• Several intra-day markets that operate close to real time; 
• Ancillary services market.  
Participation to these markets is not compulsory, as producers and direct consumers 
are allowed to enter into physical bilateral contracts. Those are incorporated in the 
production market once the day–ahead market has closed.  
 
The economic management of the electricity market is entrusted to OPERADOR DEL 
MERCADO IBÉRICO DE ENERGÍA – POLO ESPAÑOL, S.A. (OMEL). It orders the supply 
and demand bids received in ascending and descending order, respectively and 
computing the intersection between the industry supply and demand curves (market 
clearing) determines the dispatch and the equilibrium prices. 
Conditionally on being dispatched, the price to be received or paid by market 
participants is set according to a uniform-price auction.  
Namely, irrespectively of their bids, the price they receive (if producers) or pay (if 
distributors, retailers or eligible consumers) is set equal to the highest accepted supply 
bid (the so-called System Marginal Price). 
  
Market participants are companies authorized to participate in the electricity market as 
electricity buyers and sellers. Entities that are authorized to engage in the market are 
electricity producers, last resort resellers and resellers, direct consumers and 
companies or consumers resident in other countries that are authorized to participate 
as resellers. Producers and direct consumers may participate in the market as market 
participants or sign physical bilateral contracts. 
The main processes in the Production Market are the following: 
• Most transactions are carried out in the daily market. All available production units 
must participate in this market as sellers and are not linked to a bilateral contract, 
as well as non-resident retailers registered as sellers. Buyers on the daily market 
are last resort resellers, resellers, direct consumers and non- resident retailers 
registered as buyers. The result of market clearing ensures that maximum 
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interconnection capacity with external electricity systems is not exceeded, 
considering physical bilateral contracts that affect international interconnections.  
• Resolution of technical constraints. Once the daily market session has been held 
and national physical bilateral bids have been received, the system operator 
evaluates the technical viability of the operating schedule of the production units 
in order to guarantee the safety and reliability of supply on the transmission 
network. If the result of daily market matching and physical bilateral contracts 
does not respect the maximum exchange capacity between electricity systems or 
the mandatory security requirements, the technical constraints solution procedure 
is applied, which consists, firstly, of the modification of purchases or sales from 
external electricity systems responsible for this excess in interconnection 
exchanges and, secondly, of the assignation of the power of the production units. 
• The intraday market is an adjustment market that is open to production units, last 
resort resellers, resellers, direct consumers and non-resident retailers engaging as 
buyers and sellers who are market agents. In order for buyers on the daily market 
to be able to participate in the intraday market, they must have participated in the 
corresponding daily market session or must have executed a physical bilateral 
contract. 
• The purpose of ancillary services and deviation management is to ensure that 
energy is supplied under established conditions of quality, reliability and security 
and that production and demand are balanced at all times. The system operator 
incorporates regulating band ancillary services in the viable daily schedule after 
the daily market sessions have been held. After every intraday market session, 
the system operator manages any deviations in real time using ancillary services 
and the deviation management procedure. 
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1.1. Daily Market.  
The purpose of the day-ahead market, as an integral part of electricity power 
production market, is to handle electricity transactions for the following day through 
the presentation of electricity sale and purchase bids by market participants. 
BID UNITS 
Sellers on the electricity power production market are obliged to comply with the 
Electricity Market Activity Rules by signing the corresponding contract of adherence. 
Bids made by these sellers are presented to the market operator and will be included 
in a matching procedure that will affect the daily programming schedule corresponding 
to the day after the deadline date for the reception of bids for the session, and 
comprising twenty-four consecutive programming hours (twenty-three or twenty-five 
periods on days on which the clocks are changed). 
All available production units that are not bound by physical bilateral contracts are 
obliged to present bids for the daily market. self-producers and producers under the 
special regime are also not obliged to declare surplus power to the market, and may 
alternatively furnish bids to the market and will continue to be entitled to receive the 
incentives established for that regime. Buyers on the electrical power market are last 
resort retailers, resellers, resident or no resident into Iberian Market and direct 
consumers. Buyers may present bids to purchase electricity on the daily market. 
However, in order to do so they must be registered and must abide by the Electricity 
Market Activity Rules. A purchasing unit is deemed to refer to a group of network 
connection nodes through which the buyer presents bids to purchase electricity. 
• Last resort retailers participate in the market to purchase the electricity that they 
need to supply consumers under the regulated tariff regime. 
• Resellers participate in the market to purchase electricity to sell to direct 
consumers. 
• Direct consumers may purchase electricity directly on the organized market, 
through a reseller by signing a physical bilateral agreement with a producer or by 
temporarily remaining as consumers under the regulated tariff system. 
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BIDS PRESENTATION 
Sale and purchase bids can be made considering between 1 and 25 energy blocks in 
each hour, with power and prices offered in each block. In the case of sales, the bid 
price increases with the block number; in the case of purchases, the bid price 
decreases with the block number. 
Electricity sale bids presented by sellers to the market operator may be simple or 
incorporate complex conditions in terms of their content. Sellers for each hour and 
production unit present simple bids, indicating a price and an amount of power. 
Complex bids are those that incorporate complex sale terms and conditions and those 
which, in compliance with the simple bid requirements, also include one or some the 
following technical or economic conditions: 
• Indivisibility. 
• Load gradients. 
• Minimum income. 
• Scheduled stop. 
The indivisibility condition enables a minimum operating value to be fixed in the first 
block of each hour. This value may only be divided by the application of the load 
gradients declared by the same agent, or by applying distribution rules if the price is 
other than zero. 
The load gradient enables the maximum difference between the starting hourly power 
and final hourly power of the production unit to be established, limiting maximum 
match able power by matching the previous hour and the following hour, in order to 
avoid sudden changes in the production units that the latter are unable to follow from 
a technical standpoint. 
The condition of minimum income enables bids to be presented in all hours, provided 
that the production unit does not participate in the daily matching result if the total 
production obtained by it in the day does not exceed an income level above an 
established amount plus a variable remuneration established in euro cents for every 
matched kWh. 
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The condition of scheduled stop enables production units that have been withdrawn 
from the matching process because they fail to comply the stipulated minimum income 
condition to carry out a scheduled stop for a maximum period of three hours, avoiding 
stoppages in their schedules from the final hour of the previous day to zero in the first 
hour of the following day by accepting the first slot of first three hours of their bids as 
simple bids, the only condition being that energy offered in bids must drop in each 
hour. 
BIDS MATCHING PROCESS 
Market operator matches electricity power purchase and sale bids (received before 10 
a.m. on each day) by means of the simple or complex matching method, depending 
on whether simple bids are presented or whether there are bids that incorporate 
complex conditions. The simple matching method obtains the marginal price 
independently, as well as the volume of electricity that is accepted for each production 
and purchase unit for each hour in the schedule. The complex matching method 
obtains the matching result using the simple matching method, to which the 
conditions of indivisibility and load gradient are added, thus giving rise to simple 
conditioned matching. By means of a repeating process, various simple conditioned 
matches are made until all the matched bid units fulfill the minimum income condition 
as well as the scheduled stop condition; this solution is the first provisional final 
solution, obtained by considering an unlimited capacity in international 
interconnections. This repeating process enables the first definitive final solution to be 
achieved, which respects maximum international interconnection capacity, considering 
both the offers made to the daily market and specific physical bilateral contracts that 
affect the aforementioned interconnections. The price in each hour will be equal to the 
price of the last block of the sale bid of the last production unit whose acceptance has 
been required in order to meet the demand that has been matched. The matching 
result represents the hourly production and demand schedule on the network 
established by the market operator by matching electricity sale and purchase bids and 
determines the volume of electricity production required to cover electricity demand in 
each hour of the same day. The base daily operating schedule is obtained at 11 a.m., 
once the reports on the execution of all physical bilateral contracts have been 
obtained, together with information on production under the special regime that has 
not submitted bids to the market. The base operating schedule will include the 
following elements: 
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• The marginal price for each hour in the same hourly schedule. 
• Electric power by block that corresponds to each production unit whose sale bid 
has been matched, and the electric power by blocks that corresponds to each 
purchase unit whose bid has been matched. The merit order that corresponds to 
each block of the sale bids of production units that have been totally or partially 
matched. 
• Electric power by block that corresponds to the production unit whose sale bid has 
not been matched, either totally or partially, together with its merit order. 
• Electric power that is programmed by available production units exempted from 
the obligation to present bids, such as production units subject to the special 
regime, as well as power executed daily under physical bilateral contracts. 
 
Once the daily market process has concluded and the base daily operating schedule 
has been obtained, system operator will obtain the viable daily schedule, agreeing the 
withdrawal of blocks of sale or purchase bids that affect international interconnections 
if maximum international interconnection capacity is exceeded, and the withdrawal 
and/or incorporation in the base operating schedule of electricity sale bids in order to 
resolve the technical constraints on the Spanish and Portuguese electricity system 
(before 14:00 hours), without prejudice to the assignation of ancillary services. 
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1.2. Intraday Market 
The purpose of the intraday market, which is regulated by Article 15 of Royal Decree 
2019/1997 as an integral part of the electricity power market, is to respond, through 
the presentation of electricity power sale and purchase bids by market agents, to 
adjustments made to the Final Viable Daily Schedule. 
Market participants may adjust their positions in either direction (e.g. producers may 
submit purchase bids if they expect to be short, and distributors, retailers and eligible 
consumers may submit sale bids if they anticipate to be long). 
The intraday market is currently structured into six sessions with the following hourly 
distribution per session: 
  
SESSION 
1º 
SESSION 
2ª 
SESSION 
3ª 
SESSION 
4ª 
SESSION 
5ª 
SESSION 
6ª 
Session Opening 16:00 21:00 01:00 04:00 08:00 12:00 
Session Closing 17:45 21:45 01:45 04:45 08:45 12:45 
Matching Results 18:30 22:30 02:30 05:30 09:30 13:30 
Reception of 
Breakdowns 
19:00 23:00 02:45 05:45 09:45 13:45 
Constraints 
Analysis 
19:10 23:10 03:10 06:10 10:10 14:10 
Adjustments for 
Constraints 
Publication PHF 
19:20 23:20 03:20 06:20 10:20 14:20 
Schedule Horizon 
(Hourly periods) 
28 hours 
(21-24) 
24 hours 
(1-24) 
20 hours 
(5-24) 
17 hours 
(8-24) 
13 hours 
(12-24) 
9 hours 
(16-24) 
 
The schedules are the ones established in the Electricity Market Activity Rules. Those 
that appear in the attached table are the possible schedules limit. Numerous sale 
and/or purchase bids may be presented for each production or purchasing unit. 
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SALE BIDS 
All agents authorized to present electricity sale bids on the daily market and those 
agents authorized  to present purchase bids on the daily market and who have 
participated in the corresponding daily market session in which the intraday market 
session is opened, or who have executed a physical bilateral contract, may participate 
in the intraday market. The aforementioned agents authorized to present purchase 
bids on the daily market may only participate in the intraday market for the hourly 
periods corresponding to those included in the daily market session in which they have 
participated. 
Electricity sale bids presented by sellers to the market operator in the intraday market 
may be simple or incorporate complex conditions according to their content. 
Simple bids are electricity sale bids consisting of 1 to 5 blocks that the sellers present 
for each hourly period and production or purchase unit that they own. These simple 
bids indicate a price and amount of power; the price increases in each block. 
Sale bids that include complex conditions comply with the stipulated conditions 
governing simple bids, and may include all, several or one of the following complex 
conditions: 
• Load gradient. 
• Minimum income. 
• Complete acceptance in the matching process of the first block of the sale bid. 
• Complete acceptance in each hour in the matching period of the first block of the 
sale bid. 
• Minimum number of consecutive hours of complete acceptance of the first block 
of the sale bid. 
• Maximum matched power. 
The load gradient and minimum income conditions are the same as those described 
for the daily market. 
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The condition of complete acceptance in the matching process of the first block of the 
sale bid establishes a profile for all the hours of the intraday market, which may only 
be matched if this is matched in the first block of all the hours. This enables the 
production or purchase unit schedules to be adjusted to a new profile; if this is not 
possible in one part, the previous schedule can be left without modifying any of the 
hours individually. This option is used when the programming of certain hours is only 
possible if this can also be done in others, such as in order to bring forward the start-
up or stoppage process, avoid boiler bottlenecks, etc. 
The condition of complete acceptance in each hour in the matching process of the first 
block of the sale bid means that only the first block will be programmed in a specific 
hour if it is not matched completely, and all the blocks in that hour will be withdrawn 
and not the bid presented for the other hours. This option is useful for programming 
groups that produce (technical minimum) or consume (pumping consumption), a 
minimum value or nothing. It may also be useful for consumers to notify a similar 
situation. 
The condition of a minimum number of consecutive hours with complete acceptance of 
the first block of the bid may be applied when the production or purchase unit must 
produce or stop consuming consecutively at least a number of hours. The same 
condition would apply to consumers who, for example, are unable to operate a plant 
for a number of hours below the number specified in the bid. 
The condition of maximum matched power enables bidding units with limited available 
power to bid in all hours, although limiting the matched value to an overall maximum 
power. 
This condition is necessary due to the volatility of prices in the intraday market 
between hours, which make it impossible to determine the hours in which the 
production or purchasing units may be matched; however this condition has a limit on 
the power that they can sell, such as in the case of pumping generating units. 
The sale bids for each intraday market session must be such that the final schedule 
resulting from the complete acceptance of the bid plus the previous schedule of the 
production or purchasing unit respects the limitations declared by the system operator 
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for the scheduling horizon, or if it does not comply with these prior to the presentation 
of the bid, it must be close to complying with them. 
PURCHASE BIDS 
All agents authorized to present electricity purchase bids on the daily market and 
those agents authorized to present sale bids on the daily market and who have 
participated in the corresponding daily market session in which the intraday market 
session is opened, or who have executed a physical bilateral contract, may participate 
in the intraday market. The aforementioned agents authorized to present purchase 
bids on the daily market may only participate in the intraday market for the hourly 
periods corresponding to those included in the daily market session in which they have 
participated. 
Electricity purchase bids may be simple or incorporate complex conditions. These are 
the same as those applicable to sale bids, except in the case of the maximum payment 
condition, which is equivalent to that of minimum income applied to power purchases, 
which are not matched if the cost is greater than the fixed value expressed in Euros, 
plus the variable cost expressed in pesetas or euro cents for each kWh matched. 
The purchase bids for each intraday market session must be such that the final 
schedule resulting from the complete acceptance of the bid plus the previous schedule 
of the production unit respects the limitations declared by the system operator for the 
scheduling horizon; if it does not comply with these prior to the presentation of thebid, 
it must be close to complying with them. 
Matching process and results on equilibrium market prices will be the same as in the 
day-ahead market, ensuring demand and offer to comply with system’s restrictions and 
hourly prices determined by economic order dispatch.  
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2. Renewable Energy Regulation 
Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources establishes the general 
targets of 20% share of energy from renewable sources in gross final consumption of 
energy in the European Union (EU) and a 10% target for energy from renewable 
sources to be achieved by all Member State in energy consumption in the 
transportation sector by 2020. 
To achieve that, it sets 2020 targets for each Member State and a minimum indicative 
trajectory leading up to that year. In Spain, the target means that renewable sources 
must account for at least 20% of final energy consumption by 2020 - the same as the 
EU average - together with a contribution of 10% from renewable sources in the field 
of transport by that year. 
The Directive calls on every Member State to draw up and notify a National Renewable 
Energy Action Plan (NREAP) for the period 2011-2020 to the European Commission 
(EC) by 30 June 2010 with a view to complying with the binding targets laid down in 
the Directive. As the Directive indicates, that NREAP must conform to the national 
action plan template adopted by the European Commission via the 30 June 2009 
Commission Decision establishing a template for National Renewable Energy Action 
Plans under Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
For its part, Royal Decree 661/2007 of 25 May 2007 regulating activities related to 
electrical energy production under special regimes provides for the drafting of a 
Renewable Energy Plan for implementation during the period 2011-2020 (REP 2011-
2020). 
Later on, national legislation will have to incorporate Directive 2009/72/EC on common 
rules for the creation of an internal electricity market for European Union. 
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SUMMARY OF NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY 
European and Spanish energy policy 
Oil prices and the geographical distribution of energy reserves have shaped the energy 
options of developed countries for over three decades. More recently, environmental 
concerns, the intense growth of emerging countries and the ensuing inflationary effect 
on primary energy sources, along with the liberalization of Europe's energy sector, 
have been characterizing the new frame of reference for devising energy policy. 
Within the scope of the European Union, the need to make coordinated progress in 
the liberalization of markets, the assurance of supply, the development of 
interconnection infrastructures and the reduction of polluting emissions along with 
other issues has become increasingly evident. 
Energy policy in Spain has progressed along these lines in a harmonized fashion with 
other European countries but, at the same time, it presents a specific response to the 
main challenges that have traditionally characterized the Spanish energy sector and 
which can be summarized as follows: 
- Higher energy consumption per unit of gross domestic product. Spain consumes 
more energy than the average of European countries to produce the same unit of 
gross domestic product, even in comparison with those that have a similar industrial 
and productive structure and level of economic development. This situation is due to a 
variety of factors and is not an irreversible but rather the effect of the accumulation of 
energy- intensive economic growth patterns.  
- High degree of energy dependency. The scant presence of primary fossil fuel 
deposits has historically determined a high rate of energy dependence for Spain. This 
greater dependence means added risk for production processes such as those related 
to ensuring energy supply or the volatility of international market prices. 
- High levels of greenhouse gas emissions, mostly due to strong growth in electricity 
generation and the demand for transport over the last several decades. 
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In order to respond to these challenges, energy policy in Spain has developed around 
three axes: security of supply, enhancement of the competitiveness of the economy 
and guarantee of sustainable economic, social and environmental development. 
In Spain, energy policy has prioritized liberalization and the fostering of market 
transparency, the development of energy infrastructures and the promotion of 
renewable energies, savings and energy efficiency. 
Market liberalization and transparency through the establishment of mechanisms to 
guarantee that users take their decisions with the greatest amount of available 
information marks a step towards efficiency in decision-making by agents.  
The development of renewable energies is a priority for Spanish energy policy. 
Renewable energies have a number of positive effects on society at large including the 
sustainability of their sources, reduction in polluting emissions, technological change, 
the opportunity to advance towards more distributed forms of energy, reduction of 
energy dependence and the trade balance deficit and increase in rural employment 
and development. 
Naturally, these advantages imply greater economic hardship, which tends to diminish 
over time thanks to shifts in technology over the span of the learning curves. 
Moreover, in some cases renewable technologies raise relevant issues regarding their 
predictability and manageability. Nevertheless, these last difficulties can be overcome 
thanks to headway made in system management, the use of storage techniques such 
as pumping or the development of renewable facilities with storage capabilities. 
In general, the analyses conducted on the Spanish system indicate that the benefits of 
renewable energies are both high and stable. As already mentioned higher costs are 
limited and tend to decrease over time. Comparisons show that overall future benefits 
exceed present costs by a wide margin and justify the regulatory framework 
supporting renewable energies. 
In Spain, the regulatory framework governing electricity generation using renewable 
energies revolves around a mechanism known as the feed-in tariff whose operation is 
based on guaranteeing a price higher than that existing in the wholesale market for 
the technology employed. This cost increment is financed by electricity tariffs 
themselves. This is not a classical system of direct subsidies paid to producers. Under 
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this scheme the cost is shared between producers of conventional energies and 
consumers given that prioritizing the entry of renewable energy into the electricity 
system will bring about a price decrease in the electrical energy production market. 
Consumers are only financing the part of renewable production not covered by this 
effect. 
As the European Commission has pointed out, the results of the Spanish model are a 
success story in the design of policies to promote renewables. The main result is the 
volume reached by renewable electrical energy, which has attained a consolidated 
structural position of the first importance.  
It is fair to say that the 2005-2010 Renewable Energy Plan has been an undisputed 
success in that as it has not only transformed Spain's energy model as planned, but 
has also allowed for the development of an industry which has positioned itself as a 
leader in many segments of the value chain at international level. 
However, the success of the policy to foster renewable energies over the coming years 
should be measured in terms of achievement of the established development 
objectives, and especially in terms of attaining these in a way compatible with the 
technical, economic and environmental sustainability of the energy system as a whole 
while fostering competition between technologies and their competitiveness with 
traditional sources, an aim which is ultimately the surest guarantee that a technology 
will remain stable over time as part of the energy mix. Specific indicators are defined 
to monitor all of this. 
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3. Wind energy generation. 
Wind energy is the most mature and developed renewable energy. It generates 
electricity by way of the strength of the wind using the kinetic energy produced by air 
currents. It is a clean, inexhaustible source of energy that reduces the emission of 
greenhouse gases and preserves the environment. 
Wind energy has been used since antiquity to move sail-powered boats or drive 
windmill machinery by moving their blades. Since the early 20th century energy has 
been produced by way of wind generators.  
Wind energy moves a propeller and, by way of a mechanical system, it turns the rotor 
of a generator that produces electrical energy. Wind generators are usually grouped 
into facilities called wind farms with a view to achieving a better use of the energy that 
reduces their environmental impact. The machines have a working life of 
approximately twenty years. 
Spain is an energy island that is highly dependent on the exterior (81% of the primary 
energy consumed is imported and derives from fossil fuels) and it needs more security 
as regards the supply of energy.  
Wind energy is a native source of electrical generation, the third in the country after 
gas and nuclear It avoided imports of fossil fuels (which are a serious burden on the 
Spanish balance of trade and make economic reactivation difficult) for the sum of 
1,541 million Euros in 2009 and in 2010, it covered 16.6% of the electrical demand in 
the country. Spain is the fourth country in the world in terms of installed wind power 
after the US, Germany and China. 
Hence, the wind sector is key to comply with the European energy consumption 
objectives using renewable sources in 2020. 
Moreover, wind energy is a source of wealth and employment since: 
• Wind energy sector employs over 35,000 people  
• It is the engine of the rural communities in which it is located (job creation, 
purchases from local suppliers, demand for services) 
• Spain is the fourth country in the world in terms of wind energy patents: in 
2009 the sector invested 156 million Euros in R&D 
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• Wind energy increasingly contributes to GDP (3,207 million Euros in 2009) and 
to exports (2,100 million Euros) 
From an economical point of view: 
• Wind energy contribute to lower equilibrium market price (-3.4 Euros per MWh 
registered in 2009) offering at price zero and dislodging more expensive 
combustion technologies; 
• Producers receive a total income that is one of the lowest in the European 
Union (around 79 Euros MW/h, compared with 92 Euros in Germany, 86 in 
France and 152 in Italy). 
• Wind energy is the most competitive technology included under the special 
regime (which does not only include renewables, but also cogeneration) 
• Wind energy costs every average Spanish home 1.3 Euros a month and saves 
each industrial consumer 160,000 Euros on average per year 
The increasing importance of preventing climate change makes the contribution of 
wind energy even more remarkable if we think that it does not contaminate, is 
inexhaustible and slows down the exhausting of fossil fuels. It is a leading technology 
at avoiding CO2 emissions (20.6 million tonnes in 2009, entailing a saving of 270 
million Euros) 
Every kWh produced with wind energy has 21 times less environmental impact than 
that produced by oil, 10 times less than that of nuclear energy and 5 times less than 
gas. 
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3.1. WIND SECTOR OVERLOOK 
In 2010 Spanish wind sector proved to be able to comply with the goals established in 
the Renewable Energy Plan for 2005-2010.  
Last year 1516 MW where installed, for a total installed capacity at the end of the year 
of 20676 MW. It was the second technology in installing more MW in the system, after 
cogeneration. 
In the following graph we show the evolution in the annual and total capacity installed 
since 1998.   
 
Even if it is clear that wind installed capacity continuously increase since 1998, 2010 
increase is one of the lowest registered in the last ten years and suggests a probable 
deceleration of the sector due to uncertainty in the future legislation. We will treat this 
topic in detail in the next chapter. 
Last year wind energy production amounted to 42,702 GWh, 6 GWh more than 
previous year. That corresponds to the 72% of the energy produced by renewable 
sources. 
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It covered the 16.6% of peninsular electricity demand, affirming itself as the third 
technology contributing to the system after cogeneration (24.85%) and nuclear power 
(23.74%).   
 
Maximum historical production was reached in the first trimester of 2010 (13 GWh) 
when, on average, wind energy covered the 19.4% of electricity demand.  In the 
same period, plant factor was much greater than the average of the last years, 
registering a maximum of 36% in February.  
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3.2. ECONOMIC REGIME FOR WIND ENERGY PRODUCERS 
Participation of wind energy in the electricity market has been the principal element 
distinguishing Spanish model from other European realities. 
Spanish regulatory framework, defining market rules and incentives for renewable 
energies, has been evolving demanding increasing competitive performances to wind 
producers.  
The incentive system first defined in RD 436/2004 provided wind energy producers 
that started operation before 1 January 2008 two options to sell energy: 
• Participate to the spot market, receiving the clearing price plus a fixed subsidy 
(of approximately 39/MWh)  
• Receive a regulated tariff  (approximately 70/MWh), 
during the entire lifetime of the wind farm (20 years).  
So, companies could choose either to face the risk of market price fluctuations or opt 
for a risk adverse strategy and receive a fixed income. Increasing volatility in market 
price caused in changing in demand and generation mix, produced a high risk of low 
minimum income for those wind farms that opted to participate to the market.  
Project financing requiring a granted minimum income for new projects, pushed the 
regulator (whose concern was to stimulate investments in the sector and participation 
to the market) to modify the initial regulation and establish a more efficient incentive 
system through RD 661/2007.  The new scheme grants a minimum and a maximum 
achievable income participating into the market with the inventive proportional to 
market price level.  
Wind producers can decide yearly if receive a fix tariff or spot price plus a subsidy 
varying according to hourly market price, regulated floor and cap values.  
 Subsidy is calculating as showed below: 
• If (Spot Price + Reference Subsidy< Floor) Subsidy= Floor – Spot Price 
• If (Floor<Spot Price + Reference Subsidy<Cap) Subsidy= Reference Subsidy 
• If (Cap-Reference Subsidy< Spot Price < Cap)Subsidy=Cap- Spot  
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• If (Spot Price >Cap)Subsidy=0 
The values of regulated tariff, floor, cap and reference subsidy are update yearly 
according to IPC value discounted by 0.25 % up to 2013, 0.5% onwards. Value for 
2011 are:  
Regulated Tariff: 79.084 €/MWh 
Reference subsidy: 20.142 €/MWh 
Floor: 76.975 €/MWh  
Cap 91,737 €/MWh 
Due to RD1614/2010 approved in December 2010, reference value for subsidy has 
been reduced by 35% compared to 2010 until 31 December 2012, re-establishing the 
update value according to RD661/2007 in 2013.  
Wind farms operating in RD436/2004 will enter into RD661/2007 system from 1 
January 2013.  
During 2010 a strong debate on regulation for new installations was opened, with 
diverging opinions on the role of wind energy development in Spanish market.  
On one hand, the government underlines the necessity to reduce subsidy deficit (that 
is having important repercussions on state balance) cutting subsidization and 
demanding competitive performances to wind sector operators, on the other hand 
wind energy companies reject the possibility to perform as other technologies in the 
market since investment costs in the sector are still very high.   
In this unstable regulatory framework and expecting a lower government commitment 
in support wind energy, it is fundamental for wind energy producer to develop 
competitive strategies to participate to the market.  
This translates in an extensive use of prediction models, acknowledgment of market 
mechanism and looking fort procedures to optimize profits and reduce deviations in 
final programming.  
 
 4. Transactions in the Production Market: detected sales 
strategies. 
In this chapter we will analyse data on 
in the day-ahead and intraday markets to understan
adopted by wind energy producers
4.1. State of the market:
From a macroeconomic point of view, financial cris
economies caused consider
Lower industrial demand produced
while petroleum reserves’ shortfall due to conflicts in Africa pushed prices up during 
the last six months.    
In the following graph we show 
electricity market from January 2009 until September 2011
Prices started decreasing in February 2009 and reached the minimum in March 2010
(approximately 19€/MWh). The first quarter of 2010 was mainly characterized by low 
industrial demand and high wind production.
market registered numerous zeros in price curve, meaning that wind e
covering alone (or with other renewable sources) electricity demand in many hours. 
That generated great surprise among market participants and indisputable benefits for 
energy buyers. Unfortunately wind operators that did not choose regulated tariff 
regime were damaged by their own efficient performances.
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As a consequence, many wind producers that previously opted for participation into 
the market, switched to regulated tariff not to register increasing losses, while many 
installations under RD436/2004 that did not have the same possibility, had to face 
market risk and look for some profitable sale strategy.  
In the same way, cut in subsidization and uncertainty in future regulatory framework, 
ask for high efficiency in market performances of wind producers.  
Room for bettering profits can mainly be seen in three areas:  
• Improvement in prediction models  
• Acknowledgment of market mechanism 
• Reduction in deviation penalizations.  
4.1.1. Improvement in prediction models 
Being able to efficiently predict generation is important to determine not only daily 
programming but to manage companies’ cash flows. Moreover, wind farms have 
different productivity characteristics depending on the area where they are installed: 
some show peak production during night hours others during the day.  So, average 
real price received can vary greatly among installations and in different time of the 
year. Spanish wind farms show worse performances during summer time.  
During the last years many companies have invested in evolved prediction software 
and contracted external companies specialized in meteorological studies to be 
continuously updated on wind conditions, turbines performance and production levels.  
More precise data on load factor of their own installations allowed wind energy 
companies to open to a type of derivative contracts called “base load contracts”. 
Those are future bilateral contracts, signed with market agents that establish a fix 
price for a base load the producer wishes to grant. The price depends on future 
market quotations (OMIP) for the period committed while the base load is chosen by 
the producer according to its own productivity and being aware that:  
• If hourly production is less than the base load, he will pay this difference at 
real market price 
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• If hourly production is greater than the base load, he will get paid the excess 
production at real market price.  
Awareness on load factor and wind farm performance are indispensable to limit the 
risk of shortfall in generation.  
4.1.2. Acknowledgment of market mechanism 
Market mechanism allows participants to close transactions not only in the day-ahead 
market, but also into six sessions of intraday market, to adjust final programming.  
Wind producers, offering at price zero and having priority in the dispatch, are not 
concerned on offer acceptance and they can only opt for simple quantity offers. In 
many cases they do not use intraday markets unless the prediction received after the 
day-ahead market closing considerably differs from the one used to formulate its sale 
bid.  
Market agents, that manage many generation units of different sources, present an 
aggregate offer to the market and have developed some business strategy to exploit 
the economic potential of their portfolio. They adjust customers’ offers to have an 
additional income. In the case of renewable plants, they normally increase sales bids 
because they are aware they will be accepted in any case.  
Acknowledgment of market mechanism will allow wind producers to better exploit their 
resources and design some business strategy to increase their daily benefits.  
4.1.3. Reduction in penalizations for deviations. 
Penalizations for deviations are closely related to prediction models improvement since 
the “size” of the penalizations depends on the difference between final programming 
and real generation.  
Market agents, managing different power plants can “compensate” deviations among 
production units and grant a reduction in the final cost per MWh incurred. Again, 
producers are paying a portfolio effect, participating to the market through the market 
agent but what can they do to better their performance? 
Penalization strictly depends on relationship between aggregate demand and offer: 
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• If real generation is greater than final programming then penalization is paid 
only if the demand is lower than the offer (excess on the offer side); 
• If real generation is lower than final programming then penalization is paid 
only if the demand is greater than the offer (excess on the demand side).  
This simply market rule tells us that if we can predict relationship between energy 
demand and offer we will not pay for deviations adjusting our final programming 
according to that.  
In the last years, low demand level and excess installed capacity in the Spanish 
system kept the probability of excess on the demand side at negligible levels so that it 
is recommendable to declare a final programming greater than expected generation.  
4.1.3. Characteristics of the markets 
As previously seen, the majority of transactions on the production market are held in 
the day-ahead market that closes at 10 a.m. of day D-1, while the six sessions of 
intraday markets are conducted according to the schedule showed in the table below. 
                                                                                                                                                                              Source: REE web page 
Schedule horizon decreases as far as we get close to real generation time.  
Energy transacted in intraday market represents approximately 18% of that 
exchanged in the day-ahead markets.  
Energy volumes transacted in the six sessions of intraday markets in 2010 are shown 
in the following graph.  
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The largest number of transactions was held in the first session while the lowest was 
held in the fourth session. 
This “transactions’ volume order” is confirmed on a monthly base as showed in the 
following graph: 
 
The difference mainly depends on: 
• Different size of market windows; 
• Time schedule to present offers; 
• Difference in price levels; 
• Risk adverse profile of market participant.  
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Trivially the number of hours adjustable in intraday market one and two is greater 
than in the next four sessions: that implies an increasing difference in volume 
transacted. We would expect volumes to be proportional to market windows size but 
they are not.  
Sessions 2, 3 and 4 close during the night. Unless the company dispose of an 
automatic system to send bids to the market, operations have to be registered 
manually with an additional cost of paying someone to enter the market agent 
platform to adjust them during the night.  
Moreover, the majority of companies wait until last market sessions to adjust their 
final programming to the best prediction received.  
Another reason of difference in volumes relies on price levels in the different markets. 
In the following graph, relationship between average exchange prices in day-ahead 
and intraday markets is shown for 2010. 
 
Clearing prices in the first three sessions of intraday markets are lower than day-ahead 
spot price while average prices of the last sessions are much greater. 
It will be profitable to sell energy in the daily market to buy the deficit quantity in one 
of the first session of intraday markets (especially the second one) and sell exceeding 
quantity in the last sessions.   
This price trend is confirmed on a monthly basis as showed below.  
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We can state that in 2010, average prices of the first three sessions of intraday 
markets were lower than the ones of the last three sessions. That suggests a simple 
strategy that is “buy when is cheap and sell when is expensive”.  
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4.2. DETECTED STRATEGIES FOR A WIND PRODUCER  
Energy producers cannot directly participate to the production market unless they are 
registered as market agents. Since there are companies specialized in manage market 
transactions that offer additional benefits due to portfolio synergies, the majority of 
producers contract one of them to handle its commercial operations into the system.  
Additionally, in order to continuously receive production estimates, wind producers 
need to contract a company specialized in wind studies and generation predictions. 
The information is update during the all 24 hours of each day and has the following 
structure: 
 
The first three columns specify respectively to which wind farm the prediction refers 
to, generation day and time. Cat is the actual prediction expressed in kW, p10 and 
p90 are the percentiles 10 and 90 of the distribution of the prediction. Disp indicates 
the availability of the wind farms (expected capacity available for the next day), while 
evac refers to the availability of the evacuation structure. 
The 7.30 a.m. prediction is automatically registered in online platform of the market 
agent that is the only tool usable to send sales bid and adjust final programming. 
Wind farm     yyyy-mm-dd hh:mm cat(kW) p10(kW) p90(kW) disp(/1000) evac(/1000)
****** * 0:00 20168 3776 32418 1000 1000
****** * 1:00 23171 5053 36828 1000 1000
****** * 2:00 24279 4111 36310 1000 1000
****** * 3:00 24639 3099 34539 1000 1000
****** * 4:00 24378 2712 32219 1000 1000
****** * 5:00 23655 5647 31042 1000 1000
****** * 6:00 22711 8944 30063 1000 1000
****** * 7:00 21884 11789 29406 1000 1000
****** * 8:00 22023 11540 29442 1000 1000
****** * 9:00 22219 10498 29619 1000 1000
****** * 10:00 22061 8926 29594 1000 1000
****** * 11:00 20675 8039 28206 1000 1000
****** * 12:00 18927 6992 26947 1000 1000
****** * 13:00 17106 5857 26293 1000 1000
****** * 14:00 15664 4095 28688 1000 1000
****** * 15:00 14372 2397 31137 1000 1000
****** * 16:00 13213 914 32578 1000 1000
****** * 17:00 12160 237 29572 1000 1000
****** * 18:00 11296 0 25549 1000 1000
****** * 19:00 10805 0 21528 1000 1000
****** * 20:00 11169 479 19743 1000 1000
****** * 21:00 11827 1116 18765 1000 1000
****** * 22:00 12565 1763 18594 1000 1000
****** * 23:00 13210 2174 19412 1000 1000
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Some producers have also decided to sign contracts with “intermediary companies” 
(some sort of consultants) that manage their business strategies granting an extra 
daily benefit and getting paid a percentage of the same.  
Their strategic behavior is apparently very simple, as shown in the following graph, 
where monthly average transaction volumes per market session in December 2010 are 
reported. Data are representative for all months of the year. 
 
Strategy basically consists in: 
• Not to participate in intraday market 4 (this suggest no automatic tool is used 
to send bids to the market); 
• Sale in the day-ahead market a greater quantity than the prediction received 
(irrespective of some efficiency criteria); 
• Buy in intraday 1 and 2 the missing quantities; 
• Eventually adjust for changes in the prediction in the last sessions of intraday 
markets; 
• Never adjust for final programming lower than expected generation (no 
positive deviation).  
It is mainly based on price level differences previously analyzed, with maximum 
quantities offered generally fixed at 80% of total installed capacity (that is not 
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surprising, since average volatility in wind production is estimated to be approximately 
20%).  
Going through the details, it is detectable that percentile ninety of the prediction 
distribution is used as reference maximum value for sale bids in the day-ahead 
market. 
Moreover, market participant show a risk adverse profile: getting close to real 
generation horizon, limitations imposed by the system operator for security reasons 
becomes stricter and probability of energy offers complying with them becomes lower. 
So they prefer to adjust their bids as soon as possible participating to previous 
sessions of the intraday market.  
Final programming and market bids are registered daily on the electronic platform of 
the market agent that has the outlook presented below. 
 
HORA MD REST. MI1 MI2 MI3 MI4 MI5 MI6 MI1' HORA
H1 21,0 -5,4 -1,9 H1 13,7
H2 20,9 -5,3 -2,2 H2 13,4
H3 21,1 -5,5 -2,1 H3 13,5
H4 20,9 -5,4 -2,1 H4 13,4
H5 21,0 -6,3 -3,2 -1,0 H5 10,5
H6 18,8 -5,0 -3,2 H6 10,6
H7 17,8 -5,2 -4,3 -2,3 H7 6,0
H8 17,7 -6,7 -4,7 -2,8 H8 3,5
H9 14,0 -4,5 -5,2 -2,3 H9 2,0
H10 13,2 -4,8 -4,4 -2,5 H10 1,5
H11 12,6 -5,2 -4,1 -2,2 H11 1,1
H12 12,3 -4,7 -4,0 -2,0 H12 1,6
H13 12,6 -5,3 -3,7 -2,1 H13 1,5
H14 14,3 -6,5 -4,2 -1,6 H14 2,0
H15 14,2 -6,3 -4,0 -1,7 H15 2,2
H16 15,4 -6,7 -4,0 -1,4 H16 3,3
H17 15,6 -6,0 -2,2 -1,8 H17 5,6
H18 16,6 -6,2 -3,1 -1,0 H18 6,3
H19 16,7 -6,1 -3,4 -0,8 H19 6,4
H20 15,8 -6,6 -3,5 -0,4 H20 5,3
H21 14,3 -5,3 -3,8 -1,8 H21 3,4
H22 14,2 -5,9 -4,1 -2,0 H22 2,2
H23 14,2 -5,9 -4,6 -1,7 H23 2,0
H24 14,5 -5,9 -4,5 -2,1 H24 2,0
H25 H25
VARIACIÓN DE ENERGIA POR HORA (MWh) DEFINIDA POR SESIÓN
Fecha de Sesión: 04/10/2010
ENERGIA FINAL
(MWh)
************* -  ACTUACIÓN MERCADO U. PROGRAMACIÓN EPEDRE
 In the following charter we 
formulate its sale bid and final programming, before market operator receives them. 
Formulating its own market strategy, a wind producer could avoid at least the 
“consultancy company” step, directly communicating with 
avoiding a third party to receive information 
meteorological 
company
wind energy 
producer
32 
 
resume the steps a wind producer is currently
its market agent and 
on its generation performance. 
consultancy 
company
market agent 
 
 following to 
 
 
 
OMEL
 33 
 
 
5.  From an economical to a mathematical point of view   
 
As explained in chapter one, in order to participate to the daily market of day D, 
market participants have to send hourly generation bids for their power plants before 
10.00 a.m. of the day D-1.  
The selling strategies of wind power producers mainly depend on the most recent 
estimates on generation available before day-ahead market closes. They can both 
declare their units unavailable or formulate an offer according to generation 
predictions or some commercial strategies.   
The simplest and most common way to operate is relying on the last prediction useful 
for the day-ahead market (that is automatically registered on market agent platform) 
using it as sale bid and then adjust the final programming participating in the intraday 
markets sessions if some considerable error in the prediction is detected.  
Generation estimates, constructed internally or by a third party and updated all day 
long, are the results of meteorological forecasts and, even if sophisticated software 
have been developed to improve prediction models, they still show a significant 
variability (between 20 and 30%).  
When energy producers decide which energy quantity to commit to they have to keep 
into account that a considerable prediction error can determine a penalization for 
deviation and consequently reduce their profits.   
Hence, studying the distribution of the prediction error allows on one hand, to hedge 
the risk to incur in undesirable penalizations that affect the economic result, on the 
other hand, betters the speculative potential of the seller.  
Getting close to the real generation horizon, predictions get more reliable and final 
programming can be adjusted selling or buying energy in the intraday markets. As we 
have seen in the previous analysis, wind producers are net buyers in the intraday 
markets. That could depend on: 
• Average negative error in the prediction; 
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• Preference in “inflating” sales bid in the day-ahead market to buy at lower 
prices in some sessions of the intraday market. 
The existence of consultancy societies that get paid to improve market performance of 
different types of generation units suggests that some room is left for wind producers 
to design their own business strategy: being aware of their speculative potential, 
companies would reduce useless costs of consultancy and define their own risk profile. 
So, the aim of a wind energy company is to determine the optimal sale bid in the day-
ahead market of day D-1 to maximize the expected profit in day D, i.e. the sum of 
incomes achievable in both day-ahead and intraday markets minus the cost of 
deviation for all the 24 hours.  
Perfect information on generation and market prices is not available, so in the next 
sections we will include these two sources of randomness and look for the optimal sale 
bid that accounts for both of them. 
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5.1. Stochastic optimization model with generation forecasts’ 
scenarios.  
 
First, we maximize the expected profit of a wind producer keeping into account the 
error in generation forecasting and consequent penalizations it would cause.  
To be conservative we assume that we incur in a penalization any time that our final 
programming is greater than real generation. Actually we will not observe real 
generation in our decision horizon. What we will observe is a series of updates in 
generation prediction, the closest to real generation time being the most reliable.  
The design of a commercial strategy and consequent determination of final 
programming for a wind producer can be regarded as the result of two successive 
decision processes:  
1. Sending a sale bid to the day ahead market when 07.30 generation forecasting 
is received; 
2. Determine the adjustments to be made in the intraday markets, when the last 
update in the prediction is received before first intraday market session closes. 
That is the reason why we will use a two-stage stochastic linear optimization model, 
where the first stage variable will be the sale bid in the day-ahead market and the 
second stage variables will be the offer bids (quantity to sell/buy) in the six sessions of 
intraday markets. 
The model will include some restrictions mainly due to technical bindings determined 
by market rules previously analyzed and producers’ preferences.  
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The problem to solve will be:  
max  	
     p   πij  y		


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x	   y	 | 	  g	#

	
 $
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s.t.   α  e(	 ) x	 ) b        i + 1, … ,24                                                                                           1 
          y	 1 β  x	           i + 1, … ,24   s + 1, … , S                                                                     2 
          g	 )  x	   y	 | 	 ) b     i + 1, … ,24    s + 1, … , S                                                   3 
          0 ) x	   y	 78| 	 ) b       i + 1, … ,24   n + 1, … ,5    s + 1, … , S                        4 
         γ  b  , ) y	 ) γ  b      i + 1, … ,24   j + 1, … , m     s + 1, … , S                                5 
 
The parameters of the model are: 
λ	 that is the hourly equilibrium clearing price in day-ahead market; 
p that is the probability assigned to generation scenario s; 
π	 that is the hourly clearing  price in intraday market j; 
m, that is the number of sessions of intraday market; 
c	  that is the hourly positive deviation cost; 
e(	 that is the last generation forecast received before daily market session closes; 
g	 that is the expected generation in scenario s; 
b that is the installed capacity of the wind farm; 
γ that is the maximum percentage of total capacity offered in intraday market j; 
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α, β that are arbitrary parameters that define the lower bounds for energy quantities in 
day-ahead and first session of intraday market.  
The variables are: 
x	 the hourly sale bid in the day-ahead market, that is the first stage decision variable;  
y	   is the energy hourly quantity to sell/buy in session j of the intraday market for 
generation scenario s. Those are the second stage variables defined on the sets Aj 
that indicates the hours belonging to market j window.  
In the objective function the first term ∑ λ	  x		
  represents total income obtained in 
the day-ahead market, as the sum for the 24 hours of the day of the product between 
the hourly market clearing price and the sale bid.  
The second term ∑ ∑ ?∑ π	  y		 @
	
  is the total income achieved participating to 
the six sessions of the intraday market. That is the sum of the incomes achieved for all 
hours belonging to the window of any  market session j in all intraday market 
sessions: that will be negative if the producer is buying and positive if he is selling 
energy.  
The third term ∑ c	  Ax	  ∑ y	 | 	  g	B	
  represents total loss due to 
penalizations. That is the sum for all the 24 hours of the day, of the product of hourly 
deviation cost and difference between final programming and expected generation in 
scenario s. We assume to keep this difference positive and incur in a negative 
deviation since, as explained in session four, the probability of being penalized in this 
case is negligible (because decrease in industrial demand due to economic crisis cause 
energy demand to be lower than offer). This term strictly depends on the random 
component of the model, the prediction error. We prefer to be conservative and 
include it as if we would always incur in a penalization every time we offer more 
energy than what we expect to produce.  
Restriction (1) prescribes to sell in the daily market at least a certain fraction of the 
generation forecast received and, trivially, not to commit more than wind farm 
installed capacity.  
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From a merely mathematical point of view, lower bound should be zero. Unfortunately 
zero for a wind power plant means “unavailable”, with consequently restrictions on the 
offer bid to present in the next sessions of the production market: a producer cannot 
declare to produce zero and suddenly sale a considerable energy quantity.  
Moreover, in the Electricity Market Activity Rules at paragraph 10.4 “Notifications of 
production forecast for each production unit”, the right to require generation 
predictions to special regime producers is reserved to the regulator. Since he has to 
grant energy demand and offer to continuously match, if detects systematic offers 
lower than registered predictions could consider anti-competitive the behavior of a 
wind producer (that has priority in the dispatch) and sanction it.  
Restriction (2) binds the energy a producer can buy in the first intraday market to a 
certain percentage of the quantity sold in the day-ahead market. That is generator has 
to be able to produce at list a minimum of the energy quantity committed in the 
market. Intraday markets are supposed to be “adjustment markets”: a generator 
should not systematically buy energy if he is not capable to produce it at all.  
Restriction (3) links final production programming to expected generation. As 
explained in section 4, data on wind energy producers’ market behavior show a clear 
preference for a negative deviation in production associated to a negligible probability 
to incur in penalization. So we will ask final programming to be greater or equal than 
expected generation and lower than installed capacity. We prefer to account for 
penalization (including it with probability one) even if we will have to actually pay it 
only if an excess of demand is registered in the production market.  
Restriction (4) is trivial: a producer never offers negative energy quantities neither 
more than the maximum he is capable to produce for any hour and any time of 
negotiation. 
Restriction (5) bounds energy quantity offered into intraday markets to a certain 
percentage of the installed capacity, decreasing as long as markets close and 
generation horizon comes closer. That is because market regulator expects the 
adjustments to be decreasing and size of transactions becoming smaller. For example, 
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he could consider as an anti-competitive behavior selling half of the capacity installed 
at last session of the intraday market.  
In this first model, market prices and deviation cost vectors have been included as 
fixed parameters. Price curves for day D will be equilibrium hourly prices for day D-1 
while previous month average data have been used for hourly deviation costs.  
As explained above, wind producers receive the last prediction useful to formulate 
their offer to the day-ahead market at 07.30 in the morning of day D-1. That means 
the real production horizon is far from the prediction moment and can be bettered as 
long as we get close to it.  That is the reason why, a wind producer has to take into 
account this change in the precision of the forecast and include in the formulation of 
its strategy the forecasting error. 
That will be the random component of this first model. It has been studied using 
historical monthly observations. In the following section we will explain in details how 
it has been modeled and introduced in the objective function.  
Expected generation will be the sum of energy production forecasting and prediction 
error. Since error scenarios are constructed independently on the prediction received, 
it is necessary to check that the sum of the two components does not exceed total 
installed capacity. If this happens, sum should be replaced by wind farm capacity.  
Optimal solution will represent the best sale bid in day-ahead market that accounts for 
any possible observation of the error associated to the generation forecast.   
The true value assumed by this variable will only be observed after the closing of the 
daily market and a new optimization problem will have to be solved in order to take 
corrective actions (buy/sell energy in the intraday markets) and determine the optimal 
final programming.  
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5.1.1. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION USING REAL DATA. 
Model has been implemented using real data provided by FERSA Renewable Energy 
S.A., a renewable energy company successfully operating in Spain with approximately 
140 MW of wind capacity installed and 120 MW installed worldwide. 
The company has an internal operation department that continuously monitors the 
activity of the operative wind farms and has also contracted an external expertise in 
wind predictions that calculates hourly generation estimates all day long and checks 
for turbines availability.  
Predictions of 07.30 a.m. of day D-1 are automatically registered in the electronic data 
system of Fersa’ s market agent and constitute daily offer for day D for the 
correspondent wind farm if no other bid is sent before daily market closing time (10 
a.m.).  
Fersa has contracted a consultancy company that operates as a market intermediary 
with its agent, “manipulating” predictions’ results and granting an increase in monthly 
profits. The general strategy detected is exploiting price difference between markets 
selling more in the day-ahead market and buying cheaper in the first two sessions of 
the intraday market. The consultancy company has free access to generation 
predictions so that, when a significant error is detected, adjustments in final 
programming are made not to incur in a considerable deviation. 
Fersa aims to eliminate this consultancy costs and improve its benefits by developing 
its own efficient business strategy.  
Fersa’s portfolio includes wind farms subject to different economic regimes that can be 
divided into three main groups: 
1. Group 1 wind farms under RD 436/2004 that chose the “market option”  
2. Group 2 wind farms under RD 661/2007 that chose for this year the “market 
option” 
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3. Group 3 wind farms promoted but not operating, awaiting new regulation to 
be financed and constructed. 
All groups have a strong necessity to perform efficiently in the market since their 
incomes are strictly related to fluctuations in prices and predictions’ reliability.  
Installations in group 3 will have to be prepared to an expected “revolution” in the 
system that will ask wind energy to compete with other technologies without a 
sufficient support by the government.  
The wind farm used for model implementation is operating since 2007 under RD 
436/2004, and has a total installed capacity of 16.2 MW.    
Real price data have been downloaded from market operator web page 
(www.omel.es). 
Hourly deviation costs are not published daily. They become available once the 
company receives its monthly invoice. So, average data from the previous month are 
the best available ones.  
We solve the model using α equal to 0,9: that is because historically deviation 
percentage in predictions for the wind farm analyzed is 10%.   
We choose β equal to 0,8: that means we can buy in the first intraday market at most 
the 80% of what we sold in the day-ahead market. This parameter is totally arbitrary 
and measures the risk profile of the producer: the greater  β the greater the possibility 
of the regulator detecting some weird behavior in the offer strategy of the company.  
Upper bound for hourly energy offer in daily market and final programming will be 
total installed capacity, even if the probability for a wind farm to produce the 
maximum is very low.  
The parameters γ will assume the following values: γ + 0,6 ; γ + 0,55 ; γE + 0,5; γ +0,45 ; γF + 0,4 ; γG + 0,35. Those are considered to be reasonable values to bind offer 
size in intraday market sessions. 
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Hourly errors in the 7.30 predictions registered in April, May and June 2011 have been 
calculated. The data observed provide some important information on the prediction: 
• the error has been observed to be homogenous across the day, i.e. no 
correlation exist between the same hours of different days; 
• average error is typically negative, i.e. we are underestimating generation; 
• the empirical distribution can be approximate to a normal random variable; 
• error distribution does not vary considerably from one month to another.  
To formulate error scenarios we used data from May 2011, considered to be the most 
representative. Using the program for statistical computing and graphics R, we have 
plotted the empirical density function showed in the following graph. 
 
That can be approximate by a Normal distribution with mean -0,4754032 and variance  
5,3553.  
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Since observations can be assumed to be from an independent and identically 
distributed population, a bootstrapping procedure can be implemented by constructing 
a number of resamples of the observed dataset, obtained by random sampling with 
replacement from the original dataset.  
Using this procedure a random sample of 200 values has been generated and 64 
scenarios for the prediction error have been constructed calculating the respective 
probabilities. 
AMPL software has been used to implement the model, choosing simplex as the 
optimizer.  
5.1.2. Generation scenarios: case (a) 
In the first implementation we use price data from 04/10/2010 showed in the 
following table.  
 
MD INT1 INT2 INT3 INT4 INT5 INT6
1 36,53 26,53 7,31
2 28 0,01 5
3 10,07 0 0
4 10 0 0
5 10,07 0,01 0 0
6 10,07 0,01 5 3,02
7 37,43 26,2 10 11,23
8 48,97 48,97 48,97 48,97 48,97
9 46,2 48,2 49,85 47,44 46,34
10 49,1 48,11 48,73 49,11 49,1
11 48,51 48,51 48,51 48,68 48,51
12 48 48 47,53 47,53 48 40
13 48,51 48,51 47,79 48,51 48,54 45
14 47,51 47,51 47,51 47,54 47,54 40,38
15 46,27 46,27 46,27 46 46,3 39,33
16 48,27 48,27 48,27 48,27 48,3 48,76 42,27
17 48,27 48,27 48,27 48 48,28 48,27 33,79
18 49,51 48,59 48,59 49 49,51 49,51 34,66
19 50,27 47,87 47,87 49,27 50,27 49,27 35,19
20 52,01 44,21 46,81 46,81 46,81 46,81 26,01
21 57,21 54,21 54,21 54,35 54,21 54,21 50,92
22 57,12 50,09 50,09 51 51 52,84 50,84
23 52,57 44,68 44,68 45,21 45,21 47,31 46,79
24 49,1 41,6 41,6 41,74 44 44,19 44,44
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This is an interesting case since some zero in clearing price curves have been 
registered and there is room for “speculation” in many hours of the day.  
In the following graph optimal solution (day-ahead prescribed sale bid) and generation 
forecast of 7.30 are showed.  
 
 
 
We can notice that the optimal solution prescribes to commit total capacity in all but 
hours 9, 13, 14, 15 where is optimal to sell the minimum.  
If common practice defining strategies based only on price differences in market 
sessions were optimal, the result would only depends on day-ahead hourly price to be 
lower than any other price registered in the intraday market.  
Apparently, when selling is strictly more profitable in the day-ahead market than in at 
least one session of the intraday market, the optimal hourly strategy prescribes to sell 
the maximum and buy the default quantity in those cheaper sessions. The other way 
around, if intraday markets show greater clearing prices than day-ahead market, the 
best is to offer the minimum (that in this case is 90% of the prediction) and then sell 
the excess energy. How much to sell/buy in intraday session is determined solving 
another maximization problem, once error in the 7.30 prediction is observed.  
Relationship between solution and market prices is shown in the following graph: 
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In hour 9 for example, day-ahead is the cheapest market so that we would offer the 
minimum but that is not the case in hours 13, 14 and 15 where minimum price is 
registered in session 5 of intraday market.  
In this case the results depend on size of the 7.30 hourly predictions and restriction 
(5) on offer bid size in intraday markets: the producer cannot risk waiting session 5 to 
sell the amount of energy that would give him an extra benefit because it does not 
want to incur in a sanction or in a considerable market penalization.  
That would explain the necessity to be conservative in selling/buying in intraday 
markets and to keep into account deviation costs.  
If we look at deviation cost curve we notice how, even if hourly costs are greater than 
prices in the majority of hours, we can offer the maximum as long as we are able to 
annul the deviation by fixing the final program at expected generation.  
In hours 13, 14 and 15 that is not possible because of restriction (5). 
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We can affirm the solution strictly depends not only on price differences but also on 
transaction “size” and deviation costs. 
In order to show how the solution changes according to price relationship, we repeat 
the optimization procedure with different clearing prices. 
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5.1.3. Generation scenarios: case (b) 
We now implement the model using price data from 01/07/2011. The choice of more 
recent equilibrium prices is not by chance. Market prices have increased in the last six 
months because of petroleum crisis and law on national carbon. Additionally, a 
reduction in inter-hours price volatility has been detected.   
Data on price curves are reported in the following table.  
 
In this case price relationship is not that obvious. We draw the solution obtained 
together with the 7.30 prediction and previous solution to detect how optimal solution 
changes and we see how it considerably varies with respect to the one previously 
obtained.  
MD INT1 INT2 INT3 INT4 INT5 INT6
1 54,65 54,65 59,39
2 53,03 51 55
3 49,57 34,7 34,7
4 42,46 38,21 42,46
5 41,36 35,16 44 44,93
6 41,41 39,34 41,41 50,82
7 46,03 43 43,73 43
8 53,45 54 53,45 53,57 56,12
9 53,9 54,47 55,44 54 56,6
10 55,75 58,18 59,05 59 59,39
11 59,84 60,11 60,11 60,57 60,5
12 59,84 63,3 63,3 62,83 63,3 64,02
13 60,18 66,45 65,49 66,01 68,88 66
14 60,22 66,45 66 66,01 67 65
15 57,56 64,02 64,02 60,44 61,8 64
16 58,17 60,57 60,57 60,57 60,57 62 64,02
17 58,17 60,52 60,51 60,57 60,87 62 64,42
18 59,23 60,11 60,11 60,57 62 62 64
19 58,17 60,11 60,11 60,57 60,57 62,22 64,02
20 57,11 59,84 59,55 59,84 59,96 60 63,3
21 56,54 59,44 59,84 59,37 59,37 59,84 60,87
22 56,54 58,18 58,96 59,37 56,64 59,39 60,57
23 56,66 59,84 58 59,49 58,47 59,49 61,5
24 56,01 57,69 57,22 58,18 56,01 58,18 59,84
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In hours 2,3,4 and 7 when clearing price in day-ahead market is greater than in all 
sessions of intraday markets and no restriction on transaction size is active, the 
optimal strategy still prescribes to offer the maximum, while in hour 1 and from hour 8 
to 24 it is optimal to offer the minimum. 
The reason of that can be seen in the following graph, showing sale bid and price 
curves in all markets. 
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From hour 2 to 7 daily market price is greater than at least one of the intraday market 
price, while in all the remaining hours day-ahead market price is the minimum 
achievable.  
Interesting study cases are hours 5 and 6: the cheapest market session is intraday one 
but restriction (1) imposes not to buy more than 80% of what sold in the day-ahead 
market in that session. Moreover bounds on transactions sizes do not allow buying or 
selling more than 60% of total capacity.  
We can detect some properties of the optimal hourly strategy:  
• It prescribes to offer more than the predicted generation if there is a possibility 
to buy the default energy at a lower price in at least one session of the  
intraday market, avoiding to incur in a penalization; 
• It is optimal to commit to the minimum if energy can be sold at higher price in 
the following market sessions; 
• Solution strongly depends on difference in hourly prices more than on price 
level. 
So, wind producers that systematically inflate their offers into the day-ahead market to 
buy the default energy quantity in intraday markets are not applying an optimal 
strategy since market imperfection on prices create a high risk of undesirable losses 
and restrictions due to transactions’ size and penalization costs should be taken into 
account. 
Uncertainty in the production market, mainly due to changes in generation mix and 
demand level can be modeled including scenarios for intraday market prices.  
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5.2. Stochastic optimization model including scenarios for 
intraday markets’ prices.  
 
In the previous section we saw that optimal sale bid depends, together with the 
penalization cost and technical restrictions, on difference in price levels in the different 
sessions of the market. 
Electricity markets in general are characterized by considerable volatility in prices. 
In spite of that, daily price curves show a sort of regularity in their shape mainly due 
to typical fluctuations in the demand from some range of hours to the other. We can 
detect: 
• Peak- hours characterized by higher energy prices and greater system load, 
normally between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.   
• Off-peak hours night hours characterized by lower prices and system load, 
normally between 9 p.m. and 7 a.m.  
An example of typical intraday market price curve (session one) is showed in the 
following graph from OMEL web page, were equilibrium prices and demand level are 
published every day after market closing time.  
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Moreover, time series of energy prices show different type of seasonality: 
• Systems with a considerable presence of renewable energy in generation mix 
show yearly seasonality mainly due to water/wind conditions; 
• On a weekly basis, demand (and hence prices) is lower during the week end  
than during working days; 
• As previously seen, on a daily basis peak and off-peak hours can be 
distinguish.  
Those characteristics are common to any of the market session.  
Our aim is to make our objective function sensitive to changes in price level and 
include different scenarios for hourly clearing prices in intraday market.  
That will allow, on one hand to include a measure of market volatility in the problem, 
on the other hand to be more prudent when exploiting price differences between the 
markets that are not “obvious”.  
The new linear two stage stochastic problem to solve will incorporate two sources of 
randomness, the one in generation forecasts and that in intraday hourly clearing 
market prices.  
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The problem to solve will be:  
 
max  	
     p  qJ
K
J
    π	J  y	,J	


   c	  x	   y	,J | 	  g	#

	
 $
%

  
L. M.    α   e(	 ) x	 ) b        i + 1, … ,24                                                                                                  1 
          y	,J 1 β  x	      i + 1, … ,24      s + 1, … , S   r + 1, … , R                                                     2 
         g	 )  x	   y	,J | 	 ) b    i + 1, … ,24    s + 1, … , S    r + 1, … , R                                 3 
         0 ) x	   y	,J 78 | 	 ) b       i + 1, … ,24 , n + 1, … ,5    s + 1, … , S   r + 1, … , R      4 
        γ  b  , ) y	,J ) γ  b    i  Aj   j + 1, … , m    s + 1, … , S r + 1, … , R                         5 
The parameters of the model are: 
  is the hourly equilibrium price in day-ahead market; 
qJ is the probability assigned to price scenario  r; 
p  is the probability assigned to generation scenario  s; 
π	J   is the hourly equilibrium price in intraday market j in scenario r; 
m is the number of sessions of intraday markets; 
c	 is the hourly positive deviation cost; 
e(	 is the last generation forecast received before day-ahead market session closes; 
g	 is the expected generation in scenario s; 
b is the installed capacity of the wind farm. 
γ is the maximum percentage of total capacity offered in intraday market j; 
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α, β are arbitrary parameters that define the lower bounds for energy quantities in 
day-ahead and first intraday market.  
The variables are: 
x	  that is the decision variable, i.e. the hourly generation to sell in the day-ahead 
market;  
y	,J that is the quantity to sell/buy hourly in the intraday market j for price scenario r 
and generation scenario s defined on the correspondent market window, that is the 
set  Aj. 
In the objective function the second term has changed including randomness in 
intraday market prices. 
Restrictions and parameter values will be the same as before, together with day-ahead 
market clearing price and deviation costs.  
Intraday market prices have not been considered as a single time series but as a set 
of 24 time series (one for each hour). 200 price scenarios generated by Cristina 
Corchero in her doctoral thesis “Short-term bidding strategies for a generation 
company in the Iberian electricity market”, using time series factor model have been 
included. All scenarios are assumed to be equally probable. 
  
 5.2.1. Intraday market price scenarios: case (a
We first implement the mod
2010 and average deviation costs of September 2010. 
The results obtained are showed 
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because clearing price curve in day
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The effect of including scenarios for intraday market prices is clear: the new strategy 
prescribes to be prudent in any of the 24 hours of the day, a result opposite the one 
obtained implementing the first model. That is because intraday market curve, 
previously considered as a parameter, showed zeros in many hours. Now that we 
account for volatility in market prices, we keep into account the probability (high!) of 
price to be greater then the observed value. This probability is lower in hour 1, 5, 6, 7 
and 8 where the new solution asks to sell more energy than forecasted. The 
predictions are only partially inflated, that is because of restrictions in admissible 
transaction size. Deviation costs are low enough not to substantially affect the 
solution.  
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 5.2.2. Intraday market price scenarios: case (
We implement the model again with different 
2011) and average deviation 
As previously stated economic crisis, Spanish carbon law and low wind production has 
caused price market to increase remarkably in the last three months and a change in 
inter-hours volatility has been detected a
We show in the following graph as a change in 
The optimal solution obtained when day
reduced volatility, prescribes to sell more in those hours where price differences can be 
exploited. A peak is reache
that hour in the second session of intraday market. 
 
A comparison with the optimal solution previously obtained using the model
generation scenarios is necessary to see the effects 
in a context of high day-ahead market prices and deviation costs. 
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Again, keeping into account volatility in the market prescribes to be more conservative 
in some hours typically characterized by low prices and to b
hours that show lower clearing prices. 
 
This is an interesting case study to show the importance of including the penalization 
component in the objective function. 
We solve the model including price scenarios and generation sce
losses due to deviation penalizations, all the restrictions being the same as before. 
The solution obtained is the same for hours 9 onward but is much more risky in the 
first hours when it recommends to sell total capacity in the d
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Deviation costs only affects optimal sale bid for the first hours of the day when a lower 
number of intraday markets are available for adjustments. In this case, restrictions on 
transactions volumes make it impossible to annul the deviation by offering a final 
programming equal to the expected generation.  
In the rest of hours it  is strictly optimal to sell rather than buy electricity, so that in 
any scenario the solution prescribes to buy energy up to total installed capacity. The 
final programming will be total capacity sold in any hour of the day, while keeping into 
account deviation costs it will be equal or a bit slightly greater than expected 
generation: that is because deviation costs are higher than prices of the last sessions 
of intraday market. 
That let us believe that the deviation cost will have a greater and clearer impact on 
decisions on adjustment variables.  
 
One could think that the possibility to speculate depends on the type of prediction 
received: should a lower prediction live enough room for more speculations? Lower 
bounds of any of the restrictions will change according to that. 
We use data on prediction sent in a day of bad wind conditions and see how the 
solution changes.  
 
The effect on the optimal solution is controversial:  
• On one hand, a lower generation forecast implies a greater risk to incur in 
penalization when inflating the sale bid in the day-ahead market. So some 
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restrictions that were not active will now become active. That is the case of 
hours 1, 8, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 24. 
• On the other hand, admissible region of the problem becomes bigger and 
some greater optimal hourly sale bid can be obtained as in hour 2.  
The solution prescribes to offer the minimum in all those hours that are risky in terms 
of price differences and higher deviation costs.  
5.3. Value of the Stochastic Solution 
The value of the stochastic solution (VSS) can be interpreted as the potential benefit 
from solving the stochastic program over solving a deterministic program in which 
expected values have replaced random parameters.  
The VSS is the difference between the goal value for the stochastic problem, and the 
average goal value over all scenarios when the non-recourse decisions are fixed to 
their values in the expected value problem. If this difference is small, then that 
indicates that using the solution of the expected value problem will likely lead to a 
"pretty good" solution to the stochastic problem. In other words, the randomness does 
not play a very significant role. This is not the same as saying that the amount of 
randomness in the problem is "small". 
In our model we introduced two sources of randomness, one due to prediction error 
and the other due to volatility in intraday market prices. The cost has been pretty high 
since 64 scenarios have been considered for the error and 200 for prices.  
We maximize the utility function ux, g, π  and obtain the optimal solution x* that will 
provide an average utility of ux, g, π. 
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We will now maximize the expected utility, i.e. we will solve the following problem: 
max    x		
    Q(R  SR	
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L. M.    α   e(	 ) x	 ) b        i + 1, … ,24                                                                                                   1 
          S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 x	      i + 1, … ,24                                                                                                        2 
         TUV  )  x	   SR | 	 ) b    i + 1, … ,24                                                                                  3 
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where Q(R + ∑ qJKJ
  π	J  and g(  + ∑ p%
  g	. We indicates the optimal solution of this 
problem as  W and maximize the function uW, g, p obtaining uW, g, p.  
VSS= ux, g, π  uW, g , π 
We calculate the VSS of the model for both observations of intraday market prices and 
deviation costs considered.  
Case (a) with data from 04/10/2011 gives a VSS value of: 
(12.155€ - 12.032€)=133€ 
while case (b) with data from 01/07/2011 gives a VSS value of: 
(11.269-9.145)=2124€ 
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We are maximizing the daily profits of a wind producer for one of its plant: the 
improvement in the solution is considerable if we consider that it can be achieved daily 
and that the same optimization method can be applied to all other wind farms in 
operation. The results suggest that it is worth introducing randomness in the model 
even if a great number of variable and restrictions have to be introduced.  
In the following table we report the number of variables and restrictions and execution 
time of both models implemented with machine Fuji Rx200 56 (2XCPUs Intel Xeon 
X5680 Six Core/RT 3.33 GH, 64Gb RAM).  
Model #x #y #restrictions Execution Time 
With generation 
scenarios 24 6848 17.624 30 sec 
With generation 
and price 
scenarios 
24 1.369.600 3.520.024 9 min 45 sec 
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Conclusions  
The objective of this work is to look for new optimal commercial strategies for wind 
power producers, required to increase their performance in the production market.  
The results obtained by implementing both models provide important information on 
common practice currently used in the market. It is not optimal to construct the sale 
bid systematically inflating the last prediction received before market closes and buy 
the default energy quantity in first and second sessions of the intraday market. That is 
quite risky in a system where change in price level and volatility is taking place and 
uncertainty calls for prudency. 
Including in the objective function, randomness due to error in generation predictions, 
we are trying to limit the risk of incurring in penalization and create more room for 
speculation (the greater the knowledge on expected generation, the greater the 
possibility to operate efficiently into the market).  
The results show that optimal solution does not depend only on difference in price 
level in the different sessions of the market but also on transactions’ size and deviation 
costs. We can state that expected difference in price level generally determines what 
to do: optimal solutions generally prescribe to inflate predictions when day-ahead 
market price is greater than intraday markets’ prices, while offering the minimum 
when the opposite occurs.  
For this reason we have included scenarios for intraday market prices keeping day-
ahead clearing prices as a fixed parameter. That allows considering many possible 
market circumstances and relationship between price levels in the different market 
sessions.  
The solution obtained varies according to price scenarios, prescribing to be prudent 
where there is room for speculation due to a positive difference in price levels. Only 
when  the probability of day-ahead market price to be greater than intraday markets’ 
prices is high, typically during the off-peak hours, and no restriction on transactions’ 
size is active, the solution suggest to offer the maximum.  
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Deviation costs has to be included to be considered that, if a producer does not  have 
enough room to adjust the final programming and sell to much in the day-ahead 
market, he would sensibly reduce his profit.    
Solutions obtained including price scenarios are more prudent than the ones only 
accounting for generation scenarios.  
Through the calculation of the Value of the Stochastic Solution we have showed that 
there is a considerable benefit to include both generation and price scenarios in the 
objective function.  
Further improvement of the model could be obtained considering the correlation 
between the different market price curves to better modelling the dependency on the 
solution on market volatility.  
Moreover, the model has been implemented considering only positive deviation costs, 
since it was adequate in a context of low market demand. It would be interesting to 
include in the model some scenarios on relationship between energy demand and 
offer, and associated deviation costs.    
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Appendix A 
Documents .mod and .dat used to implement the first model with generation scenarios. 
 
Intradiario.mod 
 
set HORAS:={1..24}; 
set VENTANA3:={5..24};#ventana intradiario 3 
set VENTANA4:={8..24};#ventana intradiario 4 
set VENTANA5:={12..24};#ventana intradiario 5 
set VENTANA6:={16..24};#ventana intradiario 6 
set ESCENARIOS:={1..64};#escenarios de generación  
 
param precio_md {HORAS}; 
param precio_int1{HORAS}; 
param precio_int2{HORAS}; 
param precio_int3{VENTANA3}; 
param precio_int4{VENTANA4}; 
param precio_int5{VENTANA5}; 
param precio_int6{VENTANA6}; 
param coste {HORAS}; 
param envio {HORAS}; 
param error{s in ESCENARIOS}; 
param prob{s in ESCENARIOS}; 
param lambda; 
param capacidad; 
param g {i in HORAS, s in ESCENARIOS} := if envio[i] + error[s] > capacidad 
then capacidad else envio[i] + error[s] ; 
 
var gen_md{i in HORAS}>=0.9*envio[i]; 
var gen1{i in HORAS, s in ESCENARIOS}<= 0.6*capacidad, >= -0.6*capacidad; 
var gen2{i in HORAS, s in ESCENARIOS}<= 0.55*capacidad, >= -0.55*capacidad; 
var gen3{i in VENTANA3, s in ESCENARIOS}<= 0.5*capacidad, >= -0.5*capacidad; 
var gen4{i in VENTANA4, s in ESCENARIOS}<= 0.45*capacidad, >= -0.45*capacidad; 
var gen5{i in VENTANA5, s in ESCENARIOS}<= 0.4*capacidad, >= -0.4*capacidad; 
var gen6{i in VENTANA6, s in ESCENARIOS}<= 0.35*capacidad, >= -0.35*capacidad; 
 
maximize Profit: 
 
sum{ i in HORAS}gen_md[i]*precio_md[i] 
+sum{s in ESCENARIOS}prob[s]*(sum{i in HORAS}(gen1[i,s]*precio_int1[i] + 
gen2[i,s]*precio_int2[i]) 
+sum{i in VENTANA3}gen3[i,s]*precio_int3[i] 
+sum{i in VENTANA4}gen4[i,s]*precio_int4[i] 
+sum{i in VENTANA5}gen5[i,s]*precio_int5[i] 
+sum{i in VENTANA6}gen6[i,s]*precio_int6[i] 
-sum{i in 
VENTANA6}coste[i]*(gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s]+gen2[i,s]+gen3[i,s]+gen4[i,s]+gen5[i,s]
+gen6[i,s]-g[i,s]) 
-sum{i in VENTANA5 diff 
VENTANA6}coste[i]*(gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s]+gen2[i,s]+gen3[i,s]+gen4[i,s]+gen5[i,s]
-g[i,s]) 
-sum{i in VENTANA4 diff 
VENTANA5}coste[i]*(gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s]+gen2[i,s]+gen3[i,s]+gen4[i,s]-g[i,s]) 
-sum{i in VENTANA3 diff 
VENTANA4}coste[i]*(gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s]+gen2[i,s]+gen3[i,s]-g[i,s]) 
-sum{i in HORAS diff VENTANA3}coste[i]*(gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s]+gen2[i,s]-
g[i,s])); 
 
subject to Restriccion{i in HORAS}:#la programación en mercado diario tiene 
que ser superior al envio y menor que el 80% de la capacidad 
gen_md[i]<=lambda*capacidad; 
#envio[i]<=gen_md[i]<=lambda*capacidad; 
 
subject to Restr{i in HORAS,s in ESCENARIOS}: 
gen1[i,s]>=-0.8*gen_md[i]; 
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subject to Restriccion2{i in VENTANA6, s in ESCENARIOS}: 
g[i,s]<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s]+gen2[i,s]+gen3[i,s]+gen4[i,s]+gen5[i,s]+gen6[i,s]<
=lambda*capacidad ; 
 
subject to Restriccion3{i in VENTANA5 diff VENTANA6,s in ESCENARIOS}: 
g[i,s]<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s]+gen2[i,s]+gen3[i,s]+gen4[i,s]+gen5[i,s]<=lambda*ca
pacidad; 
 
subject to Restriccion4{i in VENTANA4 diff VENTANA5,s in ESCENARIOS}: 
g[i,s]<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s]+gen2[i,s]+gen3[i,s]+gen4[i,s]<=lambda*capacidad; 
 
 
subject to Restriccion5{i in VENTANA3 diff VENTANA4,s in ESCENARIOS}: 
g[i,s]<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s]+gen2[i,s]+gen3[i,s]<=lambda*capacidad; 
 
 
subject to Restriccion6{i in HORAS diff VENTANA3,s in ESCENARIOS}: 
g[i,s]<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s]+gen2[i,s]<=lambda*capacidad; 
 
 
 
subject to Restriccion7{i in HORAS,s in ESCENARIOS}: 
0<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s]<=lambda*capacidad; 
 
subject to Restriccion8{i in HORAS,s in ESCENARIOS}: 
0<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s]+gen2[i,s]<=lambda*capacidad; 
 
 
subject to Restriccion9{i in VENTANA3,s in ESCENARIOS}: 
0<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s]+gen2[i,s]+gen3[i,s]<=lambda*capacidad; 
 
subject to Restriccion10{i in VENTANA4,s in ESCENARIOS}: 
0<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s]+gen2[i,s]+gen3[i,s]+gen4[i,s]<=lambda*capacidad; 
 
 
subject to Restriccion11{i in VENTANA5,s in ESCENARIOS}: 
0<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s]+gen2[i,s]+gen3[i,s]+gen4[i,s]+gen5[i,s]<=lambda*capacid
ad; 
 
 
subject to Restriccion12{i in VENTANA6,s in ESCENARIOS}: 
0<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s]+gen2[i,s]+gen3[i,s]+gen4[i,s]+gen5[i,s]+gen6[i,s]<=lamb
da*capacidad; 
 
 
Intradiario.dat 
 
param precio_md:= 
 
1 54.65 
2 53.03 
3 49.57 
4 42.46 
5 41.36 
6 41.41 
7 46.03 
8 53.45 
9 53.9 
10 55.75 
11 59.84 
12 59.84 
13 60.18 
14 60.22 
15 57.56 
16 58.17 
17 58.17 
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18 59.23 
19 58.17 
20 57.11 
21 56.54 
22 56.54 
23 56.66 
24 56.01; 
 
 
param precio_int1:= 
  
1 54.65 
2 51 
3 34.7 
4 38.21 
5 35.16 
6 39.34 
7 43 
8 54 
9 54.47 
10 58.18 
11 60.11 
12 63.3 
13 66.45 
14 66.45 
15 64.02 
16 60.57 
17 60.52 
18 60.11 
19 60.11 
20 59.84 
21 59.44 
22 58.18 
23 59.84 
24 57.69; 
 
param precio_int2:= 
  
1 59.39 
2 55 
3 34.7 
4 42.46 
5 44 
6 41.41 
7 43.73 
8 53.45 
9 55.44 
10 59.05 
11 60.11 
12 63.3 
13 65.49 
14 66 
15 64.02 
16 60.57 
17 60.51 
18 60.11 
19 60.11 
20 59.55 
21 59.84 
22 58.96 
23 58 
24 57.22; 
 
param precio_int3:= 
 
5 44.93 
6 50.82 
7 43 
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8 53.57 
9 54 
10 59 
11 60.57 
12 62.83 
13 66.01 
14 66.01 
15 60.44 
16 60.57 
17 60.57 
18 60.57 
19 60.57 
20 59.84 
21 59.37 
22 59.37 
23 59.49 
24 58.18; 
 
param precio_int4:= 
 
8 56.12 
9 56.6 
10 59.39 
11 60.5 
12 63.3 
13 68.88 
14 67.0 
15 61.8 
16 60.57 
17 60.87 
18 62.0 
19 60.57 
20 59.96 
21 59.37 
22 56.64 
23 58.47 
24 56.01; 
 
param precio_int5:= 
   
12 64.02 
13 66 
14 65 
15 64 
16 62 
17 62 
18 62 
19 62.22 
20 60 
21 59.84 
22 59.39 
23 59.49 
24 58.18; 
 
param precio_int6:= 
 
16 64.02 
17 64.42 
18 64 
19 64.02 
20 63.3 
21 60.87 
22 60.57 
23 61.5 
24 59.84; 
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param envio:=  
 
1 4.4 
2 4.0 
3 3.7 
4 3.6 
5 3.5 
6 3.6 
7 3.7 
8 3.8 
9 3.9 
10 8.4 
11 8.6 
12 8.8 
13 9.0 
14 9.0 
15 9.1 
16 9.0 
17 8.9 
18 8.9 
19 9.0 
20 9.2 
21 9.2 
22 8.6 
23 7.9 
24 7.3; 
 
param lambda:=1; 
param capacidad:=16.2; 
 
param coste:= 
 
1 54.65 
2 53.03 
3 50.21 
. 
. 
. 
62 0.5 
63 0.8 
64 -4.7; 
 
 
param prob:= 
1 0.045 
2 0.075 
3 0.01 
. 
. 
. 
. 
62 0.02 
63 0.005 
64 0.01; 
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Appendix B 
Documents .mod and .dat used to implement the second model with generation and 
intraday market price scenarios. 
 
Intra2.mod 
set HORAS:={1..24}; 
set VENTANA3:={5..24};#ventana intradiario 3 
set VENTANA4:={8..24};#ventana intradiario 4 
set VENTANA5:={12..24};#ventana intradiario 5 
set VENTANA6:={16..24};#ventana intradiario 6 
set ESCENARIOS:={1..64};#escenarios de generación 
set PESC:={1..200}; #escenarios de precios 
 
param precio_md {i in HORAS}; 
param precio_int1{t in PESC,i in HORAS}; 
param precio_int2{HORAS}; 
param precio_int3{VENTANA3}; 
param precio_int4{VENTANA4}; 
param precio_int5{VENTANA5}; 
param precio_int6{VENTANA6}; 
param coste {HORAS}; 
param envio {HORAS}; 
param error{s in ESCENARIOS}; 
param prob{s in ESCENARIOS}; 
param q{t in PESC}:=0.005; 
param lambda; 
param capacidad; 
param g {i in HORAS, s in ESCENARIOS} := if envio[i] + error[s] > capacidad 
then capacidad else envio[i] + error[s] ; 
 
var gen_md{i in HORAS}>=0.9*envio[i]; 
var gen1{i in HORAS, s in ESCENARIOS, t in PESC}<= 0.6*capacidad, >= -
0.6*capacidad; 
var gen2{i in HORAS, s in ESCENARIOS, t in PESC}<= 0.55*capacidad, >= -
0.55*capacidad; 
var gen3{i in VENTANA3, s in ESCENARIOS, t in PESC}<= 0.5*capacidad, >= -
0.5*capacidad; 
var gen4{i in VENTANA4, s in ESCENARIOS, t in PESC}<= 0.45*capacidad, >= -
0.45*capacidad; 
var gen5{i in VENTANA5, s in ESCENARIOS, t in PESC}<= 0.4*capacidad, >= -
0.4*capacidad; 
var gen6{i in VENTANA6, s in ESCENARIOS, t in PESC}<= 0.35*capacidad, >= -
0.35*capacidad; 
 
maximize Profit: 
 
sum{ i in HORAS}gen_md[i]*precio_md[i] 
+sum{t in PESC}q[t]*(sum{s in ESCENARIOS}prob[s]*(sum{i in 
HORAS}(gen1[i,s,t]*precio_int1[t,i] + gen2[i,s,t]*precio_int2[i]) 
+sum{i in VENTANA3}gen3[i,s,t]*precio_int3[i] 
+sum{i in VENTANA4}gen4[i,s,t]*precio_int4[i] 
+sum{i in VENTANA5}gen5[i,s,t]*precio_int5[i] 
+sum{i in VENTANA6}gen6[i,s,t]*precio_int6[i] 
-sum{i in 
VENTANA6}coste[i]*(gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s,t]+gen2[i,s,t]+gen3[i,s,t]+gen4[i,s,t]+g
en5[i,s,t]+gen6[i,s,t]-g[i,s]) 
-sum{i in VENTANA5 diff 
VENTANA6}coste[i]*(gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s,t]+gen2[i,s,t]+gen3[i,s,t]+gen4[i,s,t]+g
en5[i,s,t]-g[i,s]) 
-sum{i in VENTANA4 diff 
VENTANA5}coste[i]*(gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s,t]+gen2[i,s,t]+gen3[i,s,t]+gen4[i,s,t]-
g[i,s]) 
-sum{i in VENTANA3 diff 
VENTANA4}coste[i]*(gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s,t]+gen2[i,s,t]+gen3[i,s,t]-g[i,s]) 
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-sum{i in HORAS diff VENTANA3}coste[i]*(gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s,t]+gen2[i,s,t]-
g[i,s]))); 
 
subject to Restriccion{i in HORAS}:#la programación en mercado diario tiene 
que ser superior al envio y menor que el 80% de la capacidad 
gen_md[i]<=lambda*capacidad; 
 
subject to Restr{i in HORAS,s in ESCENARIOS, t in PESC}: 
gen1[i,s,t]>=-0.8*gen_md[i]; 
 
subject to Restriccion2{i in VENTANA6, s in ESCENARIOS, t in PESC}: 
g[i,s]<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s,t]+gen2[i,s,t]+gen3[i,s,t]+gen4[i,s,t]+gen5[i,s,t]+
gen6[i,s,t]<=lambda*capacidad ; 
 
subject to Restriccion3{i in VENTANA5 diff VENTANA6,s in ESCENARIOS, t in 
PESC}: 
g[i,s]<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s,t]+gen2[i,s,t]+gen3[i,s,t]+gen4[i,s,t]+gen5[i,s,t]<
=lambda*capacidad; 
 
subject to Restriccion4{i in VENTANA4 diff VENTANA5,s in ESCENARIOS, t in 
PESC}: 
g[i,s]<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s,t]+gen2[i,s,t]+gen3[i,s,t]+gen4[i,s,t]<=lambda*capa
cidad; 
 
 
subject to Restriccion5{i in VENTANA3 diff VENTANA4,s in ESCENARIOS, t in 
PESC}: 
g[i,s]<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s,t]+gen2[i,s,t]+gen3[i,s,t]<=lambda*capacidad; 
 
 
subject to Restriccion6{i in HORAS diff VENTANA3,s in ESCENARIOS, t in PESC}: 
g[i,s]<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s,t]+gen2[i,s,t]<=lambda*capacidad; 
 
 
 
subject to Restriccion7{i in HORAS,s in ESCENARIOS, t in PESC}: 
0<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s,t]<=lambda*capacidad; 
 
subject to Restriccion8{i in HORAS,s in ESCENARIOS, t in PESC}: 
0<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s,t]+gen2[i,s,t]<=lambda*capacidad; 
 
 
subject to Restriccion9{i in VENTANA3,s in ESCENARIOS, t in PESC}: 
0<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s,t]+gen2[i,s,t]+gen3[i,s,t]<=lambda*capacidad; 
 
subject to Restriccion10{i in VENTANA4,s in ESCENARIOS, t in PESC}: 
0<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s,t]+gen2[i,s,t]+gen3[i,s,t]+gen4[i,s,t]<=lambda*capacidad
; 
 
 
subject to Restriccion11{i in VENTANA5,s in ESCENARIOS, t in PESC}: 
0<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s,t]+gen2[i,s,t]+gen3[i,s,t]+gen4[i,s,t]+gen5[i,s,t]<=lamb
da*capacidad; 
 
 
subject to Restriccion12{i in VENTANA6,s in ESCENARIOS, t in PESC}: 
0<=gen_md[i]+gen1[i,s,t]+gen2[i,s,t]+gen3[i,s,t]+gen4[i,s,t]+gen5[i,s,t]+gen6[
i,s,t]<=lambda*capacidad; 
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Intra2.dat; 
param precio_md:= 
 
1  36.53 
2  28.00 
3  10.07 
4  10.00 
5  10.07 
6  10.07 
7  37.43 
8  48.97 
9  46.20 
10 49.10 
11 48.51 
12 48.00 
13 48.51 
14 47.51 
15 46.27 
16 48.27 
17 48.27 
18 49.51 
19 50.27 
20 52.01 
21 57.21 
22 57.12 
23 52.57 
24 49.10; 
 
param precio_int1: 
  
 1 2 3 4 ......  21 22 23 24:= 
 
1 28.6 28.28 25.71 25.71  ......        25.71 27.88 27 35.64  
 
2 29 27.88 25.28 22.1 ......        32.09 30.11 30 30.12  
 
3 29 26.25 22.03 18.67  ......        43.25 39.5 41.95 43.95  
 
. 
. 
. 
 
197 47.43 43.51 49.48 47.43 ......        40.58 47.69 63 66.53  
 
198 49.34 47.99 49.34 45.73 ......  55.1 54.6 54.6 56.55  
 
199 52.92 46.87 43.87 42.88 ......  56.8 53.3 58.11 62.5  
 
200 40 41 49.98 47.69 ......       53.8 43.55 62.35 61; 
  
param precio_int2:= 
 
1  7.31 
2  5.00  
3  0.00 
4  0.00 
5  0.00 
6  5.00 
7  10.00 
8  48.97 
9  49.85 
10 48.73 
11 48.51 
12 47.53 
13 47.79 
14 47.51 
15 46.27 
16 48.27 
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17 48.27 
18 48.59 
19 47.87 
20 46.81 
21 54.21 
22 50.09 
23 44.68 
24 41.60; 
 
param precio_int3:= 
 
5  0.00 
6  3.02 
7  11.23 
8  48.97 
9  47.44 
10 49.11 
11 48.68 
12 47.53 
13 48.51 
14 47.54 
15 46.00 
16 48.27 
17 48.00 
18 49.00 
19 49.27 
20 46.81 
21 54.35 
22 51.00 
23 45.21 
24 41.74; 
 
param precio_int4:= 
 
8  48.97 
9  46.34 
10 49.10 
11 48.51 
12 48.00 
13 48.54 
14 47.54 
15 46.30 
16 48.30 
17 48.28 
18 49.51 
19 50.27 
20 46.81 
21 54.21 
22 51.00 
23 45.21 
24 44.00; 
 
param precio_int5:= 
   
12 40.00 
13 45.00 
14 40.38  
15 39.33 
16 48.76 
17 48.27 
18 49.51 
19 49.27 
20 46.81 
21 54.21 
22 52.84 
23 47.31 
24 44.19; 
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param precio_int6:= 
 
16 42.27 
17 33.79 
18 34.66 
19 35.19 
20 26.01 
21 50.92 
22 50.84 
23 46.79 
24 44.44; 
 
param envio:=  
 
1 4.4 
2 4.0 
3 3.7 
4 3.6 
5 3.5 
6 3.6 
7 3.7 
8 3.8 
9 3.9 
10 8.4 
11 8.6 
12 8.8 
13 9.0 
14 9.0 
15 9.1 
16 9.0 
17 8.9 
18 8.9 
19 9.0 
20 9.2 
21 9.2 
22 8.6 
23 7.9 
24 7.3; 
 
param lambda:=1; 
param capacidad:=16.2; 
 
param coste:= 
 
1  39.54  
2  37.93  
3  36.07  
4  34.95  
5  34.00  
6  36.40  
7  39.70  
8  52.46  
9  53.04  
10 52.27  
11 53.51  
12 53.51  
13 54.50  
14 53.51  
15 51.77  
16 53.37  
17 53.05  
18 53.01  
19 51.77  
20 51.00  
21 56.51  
22 54.03  
23 52.93  
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24 50.32;  
 
 
 
param error:= 
1 -0.1 
2 0.1 
3 2 
. 
. 
. 
62 0.5 
63 0.8 
64 -4.7; 
 
 
param prob:= 
1 0.045 
2 0.075 
3 0.01 
. 
. 
. 
62 0.02 
63 0.005 
64 0.01; 
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